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BOOK REVIEWS
Theism, by Clement Dore. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1984. Pp. xi, 198.
Cloth, $34.50.
Reviewed by WILLIAM L. ROWE, Purdue University.
Dore has written an interesting and important book, a book that should keep
many a seminar (or upper level undergraduate course) in philosophy of religion
hard at work for some time to come. The main aim of his book is to establish
theism, the view that there exists a being whose greatness is such that it is
impossible that there should be a being equal or greater. In pursuing this end he
follows the "high a priori road," finding fault with the arguments (Cosmological
and Design) that reason from the world to God. Although he does press a novel
version of the moral argument, the heart of his efforts to establish theism resides
in three chapters: one of which presents a modal argument for God's existence,
a second, several versions of Descartes's Meditation V argument, and the third,
an argument for the thesis that God's existence is logically possible. The book
begins with a reply to the claim that suffering constitutes evidence against God's
existence, and concludes with a brief discussion of agnosticism and a lengthy
examination of perceptual skepticism. In an appendix, Dore discusses Anselm's
two arguments.
Every chapter in this impressive work is filled with interesting arguments,
objections, and replies. In this review, I will begin with a discussion of Dore's
criticism of the Cosmological Argument and of his novel version of the Moral
Argument. I will then focus on Dore's two a priori arguments for theism, as
well as his argument for the possible existence of God.
In an interesting, brief chapter on the Cosmological Argument, Dore criticizes
the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) and supports one of Hume's important
criticisms of the argument. Hume contended that for a collection to have an
explanation it is sufficient that each member in the collection be explained. Thus,
if the collection of men is infinite and each man's existence is explained by his
being generated by a previous member of the collection, the infinite collection
would be thereby explained. Dore rejects my claim that Hume is mistaken about
this. I have argued that in asking for an explanation of the infinite collection of
men we are, in part, asking why men exist at all, a question not answered by
noting that men exist and their existence at any time is explained by generation
from men who exist at a previous time. If the question is why there are or have
ever been men, it is no answer to note that men have always been producing
men. The answer lacks that degree of illumination we require in genuine explanation.
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On Dore's side, it must be admitted that my argument is not conclusive. A
conclusive argument would have to state necessary conditions of explanation
and show that one of these conditions is lacking in Hume' s proposal concerning
the explanation of collections. But Dore's main interest is the question of whether,
assuming that an infinite collection can only be explained by something outside
the collection, a principle requiring such explanation (PSR) is at all plausible.
His conclusion is that such a principle is "totally unworthy of belief' (p. 18).
His argument for this view considers a supposed infinite collection of "things
which are at least as large as a quark" (W'). He points out that physicists do
not know if there are any things smaller than quarks, and claims that it would
be "incredible" that philosophers could settle the matter by using PSR to infer
such a thing as the explanation of the supposed infinite collection.
Of course, as Dore goes on to note, the proper inference from PSR and W'
(supposing that each member of W' is explained by some other member of W')
is not that what explains W' is something smaller than a quark, but either
something sizeless or something smaller than a quark. He still finds this incredible
on the grounds that we would have some evidence for each of these disjuncts.
But if this is all there is to Dore's argument, it is hard to see that it does much
to discredit PSR. Most false propositions, even some manifestly false propositions, are such that we have some evidence to think them true. So, even if we
know that there are no things smaller than quarks, it does little to discredit PSR
that it, in conjunction with something else, might give us some reason to think
that there are such things.
The moral argument for the existence of God has generally relied on the idea
that we have a moral obligation to achieve an end which, in fact, we cannot
achieve in this life, and cannot achieve without the assistance of a God-like
being. Since ought implies can, so the argument goes, a God-like being and our
immortality must be real. Dore does not discuss this version of the moral argument. He presents a novel version of the argument, a version whose central
premise is that if a person has an actual obligation to do X then that person's
self-interest will suffer if she fails to do X. Given this central premise he reasons,
with considerable skill, to immortality and a God-like person. But what about
this central premise? Dore says it is an obvious truth. I cannot see that it is
obvious, and the dictionary passages he cites in its support fall short of showing
it to be implied by the concept of moral obligation. Nevertheless, the argument
is subtle and interesting, and deserves a more extended discussion than I can
here give.
In Chapter V Dore sets forth his modal proof. Given Ss, which Dore accepts,
if he can establish both that God's existence is logically possible and that if God
exists then God's non-existence is logically impossible, then he will have established theism. Accordingly, in Chapter V he undertakes to prove the latter, and
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in Chapter VI he argues that God's existence is logically possible.
Although the argument in Chapter V is complicated, I believe it can be stated
as follows:
I. It is a necessary truth that if God exists then God's non-existence is
impossible.
2. There are only two kinds of impossibility: physical and logical.
3. From the fact that X's non-existence is physically impossible it
follows that it is possible in principle for there to be a causal explanation
of X's existence.
4. It is not possible in principle for there to be a causal explanation of
God's existence.
therefore,
5. It is a necessary truth that if God exists then God's non-existence is
logically impossible.
This is an interesting and important argument. I have doubts, however, about
its second premise. Perhaps there is a tertium quid: metaphysical impossibility.
Let us say that the existence of X is metaphysically possible just in case there
exists something that has the power to bring about the existence of X. Accordingly, the non-existence of X is metaphysically possible just in case there exists
something that has the power to bring it about that X does not exist. Clearly,
on this account, if God exists, his non-existence is not metaphysically possiblenothing has the power to bring about the non-existence of God. His non-existence
is metaphysically impossible. Now metaphysical impossibility, so characterized,
does not imply either physical impossibility or logical impossibility. So it seems
we can allow a clear sense in which God's non-existence is impossible, without
being forced to conclude that God's non-existence is logically impossible. In
short, Dare's thesis that physical and logical impossibility are the "only kinds
of impossibility there are" seems doubtful.
Dore dismisses a contingent, uncaused, first cause as a counter-example (it's
impossible for there to be a causal explanation of the existence of a first cause)
on the grounds that its non-existence is not impossible. But if there were such
a being and nothing else existed with the power to bring about its demise, its
non-existence would be metaphysically impossible in the sense I have suggested.
In Chapter VI Dare considers the claim that the existence of God is a logical
possibility. He gives forceful arguments for the view that it is not enough to say
that the claim is acceptable in the absence of a proof of God's necessary non-existence-especially if one wishes to convince the non-theist that God exists. Dore
supports the thesis of this chapter by arguing that people have experiences of
God and that it is not possible to experience what is logically impossible. He
notes that his argument is successful only if people experience God qua a being
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that which none as great is logically possible. Since he thinks this is what these
people mean by 'God,' he concludes that they do so experience God. I'm rather
doubtful that many religious people who claim experience of God do mean this
by 'God.' Moreover, the principle that if I experience X and 'X' means 'Y' for
me then I experience X qua Y seems doubtful. I might mean by 'Purdue University,' 'The University founded by John Purdue.' Although I've often experienced
Purdue University, I don't think I've experienced it qua University founded by
John Purdue.
Chapter VII is an impressive defense of Descartes's version of the Ontological
Argument. Basically, Dore argues that 'God exists' expresses a conceptual truth,
and since it therefore cannot be interpreted as the vacuous 'If God exists, then
God exists,' it follows that God actually exists. He notes a criticism of mine to
the effect that 'God exists' may be interpreted as the non-vacuous, conceptual
truth, 'No non-existing object is God.' On the view I was advancing, a proposition
of the form 'No non-existing object is an X' may be true without the proposition
'Some existing object is an X' being therefore true. If we define a 'magican' as
'an existing magician,' and suppose no existing thing is a magician, it's true, I
argued, that no non-existing thing is a magican, and also true that no existing
thing is a magican.
Dore argues that this view is conceptually incoherent, since if magicans are
neither existing objects nor non-existing objects they would have to be impossible
objects. But since the existence of magicians is logically possible it would be
possible that logically impossible things (magicans) exist.
Of course, if some object is a magican, then that object is either a non-existing
object or an existing object. The point of my argument was not that (on the
supposition that no magicians exist) magicans are impossible objects. The point
was that as a matter of contingent fact no object at all is a magican. Some
possible non-existing objects are magicians, but none of those is a magican, and
since no existing object is a magician, none of those is a magican. On the
supposition that no magicians exist, the concept 'magican' is not satisfied by
any object at all, existing or non-existing.
Dore is mistaken to ascribe to me the view that magicans are impossible
objects. He is right, however, to sense an air of paradox in my view. It turns
out (on the supposition that no magicians exist) that the proposition that it is
logically possible that magicans exist is true, but the proposition that some
possible object is a magican is false. For the latter proposition is equivalent to
the proposition that some actual object is a magician.
On the view I presented, all Descartes's argument establishes is that no nonexisting object is God. To conclude that God actually exists, it must be established
that some possible object is God. And to establish the latter, more is required
than to show merely that the concept of God is coherent. The concept of a
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magican is coherent. But ifno magicians exist, no possible object is a magican.
This is a fine book and is strongly recommended for use in advanced courses
in philosophy of religion. Dore proposes to meet the atheist on mutually acceptable
ground and to serve as a guide through quite difficult paths of reasoning to the
land of theism. Along the way, even if one finds himself thinking that a particular
path doesn't quite lead to theism, one meets with a number of cogent philosophical
arguments, careful distinctions and illuminating discussions. Anyone with a
serious interest in philosophical theology should come to grips with this thoughtful
work.

Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, edited by Alvin Plantinga
and Nicholas Wolterstorff. University of Notre Dame Press., 1983. 321 pp.
Reviewed by STEPHEN WYKSTRA, Calvin College.
In 1980-81, the Calvin Center for Christian Studies assembled a team to work
"Toward a Reformed View of Faith and Reason"; whence these essays, by
historian George Marsden, theologian David Holwerda, and philosophers William
Alston, George Mavrodes, Alvin Plantinga, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. Not all
these scholars are in the "Reformed tradition" of Calvin, Kuyper, and Bavinck;
but each does care deeply about what this tradition offers current thinking about
rationality and religious belief. This volume shows that it offers much, especially
on something called "evidentialism." Wolterstorff, introducing the essays, says
that in them "the evidentialist challenge of the Enlightenment is challenged and
overcome." In this review I shall critically survey their counter-challenge.
Plantinga's "Reason and Belief in God" amplifies almost everything he has
written on evidentialism over the last seven years. Many charge that belief in
God is irrational because there is insufficient evidence for it. Theists often respond
with arguments for theism, but Plantinga's way is different: he challenges the
underlying supposition-"evidentialism"-that theism needs evidence. Against
all evidentialists-theists and nontheists alike-he urges that theistic belief "can
be entirely right, rational, reasonable, and proper without any evidence or argument whatever." More technically, Plantinga holds that theism is "properly"
believed in a "basic" way, rather like the way we believe that others have feelings,
or that there is an external world. (Thus, when Plantinga says theism can be
proper "without any evidence whatever," he uses "evidence" in a narrow inferential sense: in a wider sense that includes "non-inferential" evidence, the theism
Plantinga commends is based on evidence-which he calls "grounds.") Plantinga's first section, discussing Scriven, Flew, and other atheists, uses parallels

